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Summary
Preliminary results of our comparative study of American, German, and
Japanese multinational corporations and their subsidiaries, operating in a
dozen or so countries, are analyzed. Results of this current study are com-
pared with a previous study undertaken in six developing countries.
The nature of the problems encountered by the three sets of multinational
companies in industrialized and developing countries, is explored. The role
of headquarters and subsidiaries in decision-making, and the nature of the
critical issues which occur between headquarters and subsidiaries is investigated.
Our analysis shows that although the nature and intensity of problems en-
countered by multinationals in developing and industrially developed countries
differ, these differences seem to be narrowing.
Note
Paper prepared for presentation at the International Research Symposium:
The Management of Headquarter-Subsidiary Relationships in Transnational Corpor-
ations . Institute of International Business, Stockholm School of Economics,
Stockholm, Sweden, June 2-4, 1980.
Acknowledgment
This project, based on work begun in 1976, is being supported by the Inter-
national Institute of Management (I.I.M.), Science Centre, West Berlin, and the
International Business Institute of the Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.

This paper is a part of the large-scale on-going study of American,
British, German, Japanese and Swedish multinational corporations and their
subsidiaries operating in a dozen or so countries. In all, some 200 com-
panies were interviewed. The main purpose of our overall study was to
examine:
The strategies adopted with respect to transfer of tech-
nology, investment policies, manpower and personnel
policies, product and marketing policies.
Structuring of MNCs both at headquarter (HQ) and sub-
sidiary (Sub) levels.
Organizational processes such as mechanisms for controls
and coordination, long-range planning and environmental
scanning, personnel training, performance reviews, and
feedback mechanisms utilized at headquarter and sub-
sidiary levels.
Decision-making and relative influences of HQs and Subs
in major and minor decisions.
The nature and intensity of conflicts in decision-making
between HQs and Subs.
HQ-Sub relationships and the nature and intensity of
conflicts and conflicting issues between them, includ-
ing the modes of resolutions and consequences of con-
flicts.
The nature and intensity of conflicts and conflicting
issues between MNCs and governments and other publics
in both the home and the host countries (Negandhi and
Baliga, 1979).
Purpose of This Paper
This paper examines selected aspects of external and internal practices
of American, German, and Japanese headquarters and their subsidiaries' op-
erations in the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Mexico,
Spain, and Portugal. The data collected from some 120 companies are utilized
in this paper. Specifically, the following external and internal management
practices are being discussed:
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(1) Nature of the external problems the American, German, and
Japanese multinationals are facing in the countries studied.
(2) Nature of conflict and conflicting issues encountered by
the three types of MNCs in those countries.
(3) Degree of decentralization or level of autonomy of the sub-
sidiaries and implications for the functioning of the MNCs'
sys tern.
(4) Headquarter-subsidiary relationships and the nature of the
critical issues and problem areas between them.
(5) Implication of internal practices on maintaining effective
external relationships.
Prior to the analysis and discussion of the results of study, a word
about the research methodology and design may be in order.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
As mentioned earlier, the project was conceived in a comparative vein;
we endeavored to study American, German, British, and Japanese multinationals
and their subsidiaries. Our aim was to collect detailed information on many
aspects on multinational operations at both headquarter and subsidiary levels.
Subsidiaries of German, Japanese, and American multinationals operating in
Europe (West Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the
Netherlands), U.S.A., Mexico, Brazil, India, and Iran and their respective
headquarters constituted the universe for the research reported in this
paper. The universe was determined from investment directories and list-
ings provided by chambers of commerce and manufacturing associations.
Considerable efforts were made to ensure that the listings were as current
as possible. The universe was restricted to firms that were engaged in
some form of manufacturing activity. Hence, firms in travel, banking,
and other service sectors were omitted from consideration. The chief
executives of the firms were contacted. Letters detailing the nature of
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the research project with the request for a personal interview with the
chief operating officers and/or representatives of the top management team
were then mailed out.
At this juncture, it appears appropriate to make some remarks on the
sample that was utilized in the analysis. Ideally, in order to have some
confidence (statistically) in the results, the random sample needed to be
large enough. Matchging was impossible as historical patterns of Japanese,
German and American investments in Europe have been quite different, with
Japanese multinationals being a more recent phenomenon. As there were con-
siderable uncertainties about the cooperation that could be obtained from
multinational corporations' executives, a conscious random sampling pro-
cedure was not adopted. It can, however, be asserted that the final sample
that did result was a random sample in a sense that every firm in the uni-
verse had the same chance of participating or not participating in the
study. However, in order to increase the generalizability and external
validity of the study, considerable supplemental information was obtained
both on the companies that had participated in the study and otherwise.
Despite these efforts, the reader is cautioned to bear the limitations of
the sample in mind when reading through the analyses and discussions.
Indepth interviews were then conducted with chief executive officers
and/or top management representatives from all firms that had agreed to
participate in the study. The interviews lasted about four to eight hours
on an average and in most cases included luncheon and dinner sessions.
These sessions proved to be extremely valuable as the executives tended
to relax, and, in narrating episodes related to the organizational func-
tioning, they revealed significant, though subtle, aspects of their
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TABLE 1
PROFILE OF THE COMPANIES STUDIED
Country of Origin
Type of Industry
Heavy Engineering
Light Engineering
Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Electrical and Electronics
Automobile
Tires and Rubber Products
Foods
Mixed-Diversified Trading Companies
with Manufacturing Investments 12
United States Germany Japan
(N=34) (N=45) (N=41)
12 14 2
5 6 14
7 21 4
0- 2 6
6 2 2
3
1 1
Ratio of Equity
Wholly Owned
Majority Ownership
50-50 Ownership
Minority Ownership
Size; Number of Employees
5000 and more
1001 to 4999
501 to 1000
201 to 500
101 to 200
100 or less
Information Inadequate
32 44 31
2 1
1 5
4
5 6 2
11 11 2
4 9 4
4 4 9
3 8 3
N
1 3 5/V
26
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operations. In those instances where organizational members other than
the chief executives were present, consensus or majority responses were
the ones utilized for analysis. Profiles of the companies studied are
given in Table 1.
EXTERNAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
It is generally recognized that the nature and intensity of issues
(conflicts) between MNCs and developing countries are more pronounced than
those between multinationals and the industrially developed countries. To
provide a comparative perspective on the MNCs' relationships with the in-
dustrialized countries, we will examine some of the issues that have gen-
erated conflict in the developing countries, the nature of conflict, and
the manner in which American, European, and Japanese multinationals have
dealt with this conflict. Mikesell (1971, p. 30) has identified the fol-
lowing factors as having the potential of causing conflict between MNCs
and host governments, particularly with respect to the mineral and petro-
leum industries:
Division of total net revenues from operations between
the foreign country and the host government.
The control of export prices, output, and the other
conditions affecting the level of total revenues.
The domestic impact of foreign company operation.
The percentage of foreign ownership.
Bergsten (1974, p. 152) has indicated that the differences between
the domestic socio-economic objectives of the host government, and the ob-
jectives of the foreign investor, give rise to conflicts between these two
parties. In more specific terms, he identifies the following issues over
which conflicts and tensions are bound to arise:
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Job quota requirements by the host government; quanti-
tative and qualitative aspects.
Requirement for use of local inputs and parts in manu-
facturing.
Research and development activities.
Export requirements.
Market power of foreign investors; a demand for reduc-
tion in order to promote local enterprises.
External financing requirement.
Building up a high-technology enterprise.
Reduction of imports.
Ownership requirement: a reduction of foreign share,
and an increase in local participation.
A U.S. State Department study analyzing the nature of conflict between
American firms and host countries (predominantly "developing") indicated
that of the 198 cases of conflict, approximately 68% were related to equity
issues (see Table 2). A previous study in developing countries (Negandhi
and Baliga, 1979) surfaced three conflict-ridden issues: equity, localiza-
tion of managerial control, and transfer pricing (see Table 3). The study
further indicated that American and European multinationals have had prob-
lems in effectively managing their interactions with the host governments'
representatives and their agencies, whereas Japanese multinationals had
problems dealing with labor, distributors, and local managers. In specific
terms, the type of problems experienced by American and European multi-
nationals centered around equity dilution, reduction in royalties, and
technology and management know-how transfer, while Japanese MNCs were con-
cerned about their relatively higher turnover rates, absenteeism, and low
productivity of their employees.
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TABLE 2
ISSUES CAUSING CONFLICT BETWEEN U.S. INVESTORS
AND THE HOST COUNTRIES
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 Total
Equity - 1 1 - 2 2 1 3 - 5 39 74 128
Participation ___i____-»_6 7
Pricing Policy ___________3 3
Controls by
Government -112 12 ---126 25 50
Expansion of
Exports _____________
Interference with
Host Economy _1________14 g
Interference with
Socio-Cultural Norms -__________2 2
Interference by MNCs'
Home Governments with
Host Governments *
Policies ___________! 1
Conflict with
National Sovereignty --_-______!_ 1
- 3 2 3 14 2 1 3 1 7 47 115 198
Source: U.S. State Department: Disputes Involving U.S. Foreign Investment:
July 1, 1971 through July 1, 1973, Bureau of Intelligence & Research,
RECS-6, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1974.
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TABLE 3
ISSUES CAUSING CONFLICT BETWEEN MNCs AND HOST COUNTRIES
(Interview Responses)
Far Latirt Both
East America Areae Total*
n a to CD
o
to
y
(0 to
u
CO
o
m
CJ
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1
Equity Participation by
Locals 13 14 1 13 14 1 28
Management Control in
the Hands of Local
Nationals 15 17 13 2 3 2 17 20 15 52
Control on Exchange 2 3 1 2 4 6
Control on Imports 3 1 1 3 1 1 5
Expansion of Exports 3 2 2 1 1 4 3 2 9
Transfer Pricing
(Pricing Policies) 6 6 2 5 2 11 8 2 21
Use of Local Inputs 2 2 2
Interference by Host
Government in Cor-
porate Affairs 2 2 1 2 3 5
Contributions to
Economic Plans of
Host Nations 2 2 4 4
Interference with Socio-
Cultural Norms 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 4
Interference with MNCs'
Home Governments with
Host Governments'
Policies 1 1 2 2
Total 48 46 19
Total
113
12 10 3
Total
25
60 56 22 138
Total
138
* This total exceeds the conflict total utilized in the analysis as some of
the conflict-types involved had more than one cause associated with them,
i.e., a negotiational conflict, for example, could have resulted from de-
mands for both equity reduction and localization of personnel.
Source: Interview data. Reproduced from Anant R. Negandhi and B. R. Baliga,
Quest for Survival and Growth
, pp. 15.
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As it can be seen from Table 4, the industry-specific and the firm-
specific factors were not significantly related to the nature and intensity
of the conflicts between the multinationals and the host countries. Al-
though the six countries in which research was undertaken are generally
classified as "developing countries," the impact of country-specific fac-
tors on MNC-host-country conflicts was observable. Conflicts and problems
encountered in India and Peru were more intense than those in Brazil,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (for details, see Negandhi and Baliga,
pp. 35-40).
NATURE OF EXTERNAL ISSUES BETWEEN MNCs
AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Although many of the industrialized countries are operating as "free
and open markets" and are generally very congenial to foreign investors,
lately, they too have begun to question the utility of unchecked foreign
investments. In other words, the governmental decision-makers as well as
other public groups (labor unions, consumer advocates, environmentalists,
and so on) are discovering that national needs, ambitions and objectives
can be at variance with the MNCs' objectives, goals, and strategies.
The range, nature, and intensity of these Issues, of course, differ
considerably from country to country, depending upon the prevailing politi-
cal climate and economic conditions (unemployment, inflation, balance of
payment position) and the level of industrial and economic development.
For example, in a study of MNCs in developed countries, Fry (1977) reported
that the issue of worker participation ("Mitbestimmung") was the one most
prominent in West Germany, and the traditional issues such as providing
new technology, employment, upgrading wages, and the developing local
resources were considered secondary by the governmental officials.
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TABLE 4
INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF MNCs (SUBSIDIARIES)
AND THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
Company
Attributes
(N - 100)
Nature of Conflict Level of
Signifi-
canceNegotiational Policy Operational
Equity holding
whollv-owned
%
36
%
36
%
28
p < .08
maj ority-owned 38 27 35
minority-owned 20 60 20
Market Share
more than 60% 40 35 25
p < .4704
26-59% 33 42 25
less than 26% 35 27 38
Degree of Com-
petitiveness
seller's market 70 30
p < .05
moderately
competitive 46 37 17
highly
competitive 25 36 39
Expectatlonal
Difference
(between MNCs and
host governments)
large difference 54 28 18
2 < .003
moderate difference 27 59 14
little or no
difference 21 28 51
Number of
Employees
more than 1000 40 31 29
p < .0421
999 to 400 40 40 20
399 to 100 19 50 31
less than 100' 17 83
Size of Investment
$4.9-$3 Million 43 31 26
P < .5315
$2.9-$2 Million 33 42 25
$1.9-$. 5 Million 20 40 40
less than $500,000 60 40
Source: Authors' interviews.
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In contrast, in Belgium the major issues pertaining to the multi-
national corporation's functioning were related to employment capabilities,
potential effect on balance of payments position, research and development
activities (lack of), development and utilization of local resources, and
worker participation in management. Simultaneously, however, MNCs empha-
sized their importance in terms of increasing entrepreneurial spirit, pro-
viding new technology, and making consumer goods at lower prices. These
differences in expectations between the government and the multinational
corporations' priorities are clearly highlighted in Table 5.
Particularly, since the oil-crisis of 1973, most of the industrialized
nations have experienced a downturn in their economic growth and prosperity,
which in turn has created considerable hostility not only toward foreign
multinationals but also among the opposing groups in a given society
(management against labor, multinationals against foreign multinationals,
and multinationals against their own sub-contractors). For example, faced
with the declining sales of the U.S. automobiles all the three big U.S.
auto companies (G.M., Ford, and Chrysler) has begun to denounce auto im-
ports from Japan and European countries and asked the U.S. Congress and
the President to help. At the same time, their own sub-contractors have
publicly accused auto companies as "double talkers" by asserting that "it
is not just imported cars, it's imported parts that is causing problems"
(Wall Street Journal
, pp. 1). The growing complaints about Detroit's
policies of importing parts for domestically assembled cars have now
reached Washington. Consequently, congressional proposals that were
originally designed to limit imports of autos are being amended to place
restriction on imported parts also (Wall Street Journal
, pp. 1).
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TABLE 5
EXPECTATION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATION-STATES
Impact
Worker Participation
Increase Competition
Capital Inflows
Increase Skilled Employment
Create Entrepreneurial Spirit
Germany
Government Wants More Firms Give More
X
X
Belgium
X
X
X
Government Wants More Firms Give More
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Impact
Increase General Employment
Increase Skilled Employment
Balance of Payment Effects
Increase R&D Efforts
Develop Local Resources
Worker Participation
Worker Awareness
Increase Quality of Consumer
Services X
Social & Cultural Values X
Increase Entrepreneurial Spirit X
Provide New Technology X
Create Lower Prices X
Source: David E. Fry. Multinational Corporations - Host Government
Relationships: An Empirical Study of Behavioral Expectations .
Unpublished D.B.A. dissertation, Kent State University, 1977.
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Table 6 illustrates the nature of demands made by the multinational
companies in West Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and France.
As can be seen from Table 6, economic stagnation, triggered by the
oil crisis, has generated traditional economic demands even in the more
industrialized nations of the world. However, except in the case of Spain
and Portugal, the European countries in which field research was under-
taken have not yet legislated these demands as has been done in the de-
veloping countries. Thus far these countries do not discriminate unduly
in favor of domestic corporations over multinational corporations.
One thing appears clear: the less economically developed a country
and/or more intensive the economic problems, the more demands are placed
on multinational corporations and the more willing the country is to leg-
islate these expectations.
Table 7 shows the nature of problems faced by the American, German,
and Japanese MNCs in various industrialized countries. The labor force
seems to be the source of almost half the problems faced by the multi-
nationals. However, U.S. and German subsidiaries have, proportionately,
more labor problems than Japanese companies. The underlying theme of
labor-management problems is, however, quite different in the various
countries. In Germany, for instance, industry-representatives were in-
volved in challenging the constitutional validity of the "codetermination"
laws and influencing the election of representatives who were against the
codetermination laws. The U.S. multinational subsidiaries, owing to
workforce-size stipulations in the law, were most susceptible to the laws.
Given the confrontationary nature of management-labor relations in the
United States, American multinationals initially had a difficult time
accepting the collaborative philosophy.
-14-
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Outside Germany all multinationals, especially the larger U.S. and
German multinationals, have been the targets of leftist ideology oriented
labor unions. This has been particularly true of Spain and Portugal vhere
rising nationalistic expectations have made the issue even more difficult
to handle. Japanese multinationals appears to have avoided serious prob-
lems with labor, to some extent, by their small size and willingness to
go into joint ventures with either government organizations or private
entrepreneurs. This finding is interesting in the light of the fact that,
despite being involved in joint ventures or minority holdings in the de-
veloping countries, Japanese organizations have had considerable problems
with labor (Negandhi and Baliga, 1979) . These problems stemmed mainly from
historical factors and efforts made by Japanese to impose their management
style. It appears that the Japanese multinationals have learned from their
experience in the developing countries of Asia and South America, and have
restricted the use of a Japanese management style (such as life-time em-
ployment, and demanding loyalty to the company) in the industrialized
countries.
Japanese subsidiaries were involved, however, in conflicts with the
EEC commission. Problems were centered around charges of "dumping" by
Japanese organizations, despite the fact that the accused Japanese com-
panies had manufacturing subsidiaries in EEC countries. The Japanese or-
ganizations responded by adopting a legalistic stance while simultaneously
emphasizing their local manufacturing activities in efforts to make the
"dumping" charge untenable.
-17-
INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
In this section, we will examine selected aspects of internal prac-
tices of American, German, and Japanese multinational companies and explore
the implmications of these practices on external relations. Specifically,
we will discuss the results of the study concerning,
(a) Level of decentralization or the degree of subsidiary
autonomy.
(b) Headquarter-subsidiary relationships and the nature of
major problems encountered in these relationships.
Level of Decentralization
Centralization versus subsidiary autonomy is a perennial and conflict-
ing situation faced by most multinational companies. Increasing competi-
tion in the world market requires some measure of rationalization of pro-
duction and marketing processes at a global level, thus requiring a higher
degree of centralization of decision-making at the headquarter and/or
regional headquarter levels, while increasing demands are being made by
the host as well as by the home countries of the multinationals. To assist
them to solve their complex socio-economic problems, high degree of sub-
sidiary autonomy is necessary.
To assess the relative influence of the headquarters and subsidiaries
in decision-making, we examined the decision-making with respect to the
following factors:
Borrowing from local banks
Use of cash flow by subsidiary
Extension of credit to major customers
Choosing public accountant
Introduction of new product for local market
Servicing of products sold
Use of local advertising agency
Expansion of production capacity
-18-
Maintenance of production facilities
Appointment of chief executive
Use of expatriate personnel
Layoff of operating personnel
Training programs for local employees
These decisions were then identified as either strategic or routine. An
Overall Delegation Index was then computed with strategic decisions weighted
three times as much as routine decisions. The weighting factor was chosen
to reflect the approximate ratio of time span of feedback of strategic de-
cisions to routine decisions. Table 8 presents the findings for the Overall
Delegation Index and the extent of delegation provided to the subsidiary's
management along with a set of decisions.
As it can be seen from the table, the Overall Delegation Index is
fairly low in absolute terms. Despite the headquarters' acknowledgment
of less than perfect understanding of the subsidiary's operation and its
environment, the subsidiary influence on major decision-making is minimal.
Relatively speaking, Japanese subsidiaries seem to enjoy the most
autonomy, and the U.S. subsidiaries the least. German subsidiaries are
in between these two extremes. Our results are consistent with earlier
studies by Franko (1976) and Dyas and Thanheiser (1976).
Particularly, the executives working for U.S. subsidiaries in Western
Europe, displayed the same frustrations in controlling their own organiza-
tions as those working in developing countries. Listen, for example, to
some of their concerns voiced in our study in the developing countries.
An American executive in Thailand, complaining about the excessive
control and reporting needed by the U.S. headquarters, stated:
For these whiz kids who are playing around with
the figures but really don't know what to do with the
data. . . . [The] more you supply, [the] more they
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want . . . and my two (expatriate) assistants and I
spend 60 percent of our time in generating reports
and data, and I surely hope somebody is using them
at least as toilet paper.
In a similar vein, another American expatriate, who had been posted
to India after twenty-five years of service at the home office, said:
Headquarters demand a lot of documentation from
here . . . (but) as far as top brass is concerned,
they seem to know very little about what is happening
in these countries.
Explaining his relationship with the home office, he pointed out:
We take home leave ... take a weak off to go to
our headquarters . . . socialize with the people we
know, but communicate with nobody on substantial
matters ... I sometimes wonder whether the president
or even the vice-president of our international divi-
sion will recognize me . . . They simply do not care.
Yet another American executive in Thailand echoed his frustration, saying:
I really question whether the top brass at the
home office listen to what we say and report ... I
think they are not mature enough to know the condi-
tions prevailing here. ... We are just beating the
durms, nobody cares to listen back home.
Japanese companies, on the other hand, seem to have mastered the so-
called "z" mode of operation in which organizational members are accul-
turated and socialized toward a common set of organizational and societal
values (Ouchi and Jaeger, 1978). Given such orientation, headquarters are
not concerned about losing their control in spite of higher autonomy
afforded to the subsidiary operations. This is the most charitable ex-
planation about the Japanese subsidiary's greater autonomy. The least
chariable explanation may be that the Japanese headquarters simply have
not learned how to control their subsidiaries and operate with a global
concept.
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In examining the similarities and differences in decision-making in-
fluences in various functional areas, we found no significant differences
between U.S. and German MNCs with respect to the decisions concerning the
local personnel. They were both relatively enjoying a greater autonomy
in this regard, although Japanese subsidiaries, here too, were the most
decentralized.
With regard to expatriate personnel, we noted that headquarters pre-
fer to limit the delegation provided to the subsidiary-executives and this
is not surprising. Edstrom and Galbraith (1977) have pointed out that
expatriate personnel are significant links in the control mechanisms em-
ployed by the headquarters. Interestingly, even here, Japanese subsidiary-
executives appear to exercise greater influence than either their American
or German counterparts. This could reflect a willingness on the part of
the headquarters' management to place greater reliance on the judgment of
their representatives in the field. It could also reflect the fact that
being relative newcomers to MNC-sys terns (Tsurumi, 1976) they have yet to
develop a field-tested international executive group at the headquarters
to control their subsidiary operations.
It is easy to understand the high frustration of U.S. subsidiary-
executives when one looks at the delegation accorded to them on routine
production decisions. They have the least authority of the three MNC-
systems studied. Here it clearly reflects the need for rationalization
and standardization of operations practiced by U.S. MNCs. The relatively
larger size of U.S. operations may also contribute to this quest for ef-
ficiency.
i
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The headquarter' s influence increases considerably on strategic produc-
tion decisions, though even here, the Japanese subsidiary's executives
appear to have more influence. The delegation pertaining to operation and
strategic marketing decisions followed a pattern similar to that for routine
and strategic production decisions. A senior U.S. -subsidiary executive
seems to have voiced the concern of many when he narrated the following
episode:
The opening of regional headquarters in Brussels has
taken away much of our decision-making power and
authority. Just recently we voiced strong objection
to an advertising program that the regional head-
quarters was proposing to us in Britain. Our objec-
tions went unheeded and the advertising campaign
turned out to be a disaster. We are also having
problems recruiting managerial personnel because
the job lacks any real challenge and decision-making
authority.
The need to rationalize production on a global scale has generated addi-
tional pressure to the marketing operations.
This limited delegation of strategic marketing decision has posed
problems for some Japanese firms operating in the United States. Sony,
for example, could not react fast enough to competition surpassing some
of Sony's higher quality products nor could they deal with erosion of re-
tail price maintenance policies adquately.
From the above it appears that the headquarters' management is still
relatively unwilling to recognize the differences of host-environmental
conditions and their effects on the subsidiary's operations.
The delegation is also fairly limited on financial decisions. It is
to be expected that in a multinational corporation system with numerous
subsidiaries, finance would clearly be the language of management. However,
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practically all the subsidiaries studied had a functional form of organi-
zational structure. The functional specialization leads to a lessening
of the emphasis on financial management; for example, capital expenditure
decisions get subsumed under decisions to expand production capacity, etc.
The greater level of delegation in Japanese subsidiaries seems to be a
function of size. Being much smaller than their American or German counter-
parts, the monetary sums involved in financial transactions are likely to
be fairly small. An alternative explanation is suggested by the close
relationship of Japanese organizations to Japanese banks (Caves and Uekusa,
1976). As a consequence of this close relationship between banks and head-
quarters, it is relatively easy to establish zones of authority (Burrage,
1972) within which the subsidiaries can function in a relatively autonomous
manner.
We also examined the extent to which the various MNC-systems were
formalized. Not surprisingly, there was a relatively high correlation be-
tween extent of delegation provided to the subisidary's management and the
extent of formalization. U.S. MNCs were the most formalized. As we saw
earlier, many U.S.-subsidiary executives interviewed felt hampered by this
formalization, especially in the developing countries.
Critical Problems Between Headquarter
and Subsidiary Operations
During the interviews with the senior executives of both headquarters
and subsidiaries, we proble into some of the critical problems encountered
in headquarter-subsidiary relationshps. Besides examining the nature and
intensity of such focal issues between headquarters and subsidiaries, we
also attempted to assess the relative influences of the headquarter and
the subsidiary in resolving such issues.
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Approximately one-half of the subsidiaries of the American, German,
and Japanese multinational companies studied indicated that no serious
problems existed in their relationships with the headquarters. Of the 48
critical issues narrated by the subsidiaries' executives, roughly one-third
were concerning the lack of subsidiary's autonomy in dealing with the prob-
lems faced by them in the host countries; approximately one-fourth of
these issues were concerning capital investment decisions. Table 9 shows
the range of problems between headquarters and subsidiaries operations.
Comparatively, as we discussed earlier, Japanese subsidiaries enjoyed
more autonomy in decision-making than those of the American and German
multinationals and accordingly reported less frustrations in this regard.
Overall, there were no significant differences between the American and
German companies. The global rationalization of production and marketing
processes being practiced by the American and German MNCs seem to have re-
sulted in similar challenges and problems. The following examples repre-
sent the nature of issues between headquarters and subsidiaries.
1. The General Manager of an American subsidiary in Britain complained
bitterly about the price for his exports being determined by the
marketing manager at the European headquarter. Yet the subsidiary
was responsible for meeting profit targets. This procedure led to a
considerable degree of tension between the subsidiary and the European
headquarter and the parent company has made no effort to resolve
these differences.
2. An American multinational wanted to terminate the operations of its
subsidiary in Sweden as the plant was very old and productivity was
low. When the plans were made public there was a considerable amount
wH
A
tn
0)
o 9
55 CO
CD
(-1
a
o >4
•h e
4J O
to s
N O
•H *J
3 g
Q) <
00
M
4J CD
C OJ
CM O
cr
rH o
c*
CM
o\
CM
CO
m
•3-
CO
<7\
<o
en
o
rH CT>
m «n
H co
CM CM
4J O
co ck
4-1 CO
c a)
3 iH
O OO nH
r-l
s e*
H
CO CJ
a> c
r-l CO
CO B
CO «H
rH C
CO ID
JJ §
«H 4J
O. 0]
a ai
co z
0)
CM
•
CO
CM O CO
cr —
—. CM
r-i O •
cr r*.
ir>
cm o
a*
iH o
cr
cm o
cr
r-l o
a*
CM O
cr
i-H O
cr
•
t-i
•a-
CO
CO
-a-
r-l
•a-
CO
rH
CM
•
CM
CM
vO
CM
co
CO
CO
«n
to
i-H
CO
CO
co
CO
co
CO
CM
m
o
vo
• •
-a- r-»
cm co
vo
CO
CM
>a-
CM
CO
•
co
CO
CO
co
m
CO
o
-a-
co
o
CO
o\
r^ m •
CM O CM «a- i*.
cr ^^ **^ CM
^s» co CM ^*.
rH O * • r-«.
cr o CM •
*^^ rH rH r^
55 ^«. *»*^ -»»
CO m co
^
0)
o
3
fl
c
co
O.
4
CO
00
•H
to
<4H
CD a
V
00 o
tn CO rH
01 4J
00 c
CO 01
4J u
a u
o> 0)
u Pi
i-i
<u Cj
u. §
> rH
o O m
Pi O co
•
o O SO
4-> 4J
II
CO CD
u 14 0)
Q> 0) 1-1
VH <4H CO
0) OJ 9
M U cr
(0
< O CM O "rl-
cr cr
-26-
of concern. The Swedish government was very unhappy and started
pressuring the local management to keep the plant viable. Ultimately,
a compromise was reached to keep the subsidiary operations open for
some time. The subsidiary's executives were not, however, sure about
the next step headquarter may take.
3. The U.S. parent company fired the marketing manager of its German
subsidiary as he was not able to stay and manage within a budgeted
amount. The Controller at the headquarter felt that the demonstrated
skills of the marketing manager and his sales performance were not
adequate to offset his overrun on the budget. His firing was seen
as setting an example to other subsidiary executivies to stay within
budget at any cost. This incident had affected the morale of other
senior executives.
4. The subsidiary of an American firm in France wanted to set up a profit
sharing system with its employees. Headquarter was strongly opposed
to such a move and asserted that they would rather divest than be a
party to the new social policy. Despite insistent complaints by sub-
sidiary management that the headquarter' s personnel were insensitive
to local issues, it refused to let the subsidiary negotiate the agree-
ment. The net result was a series of strikes by the French subsidiary
employees.
5. There was considerable argument between German headquarter and its
Portugese subsidiary management about additional investment in a par-
ticular product line. The subsidiary had lost a considerable amount
of money in the previous 15 years and the headquarter was very wary
of additional investment. The subsidiary kept developing reports
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that showed that the investment was very desirable. Headquarter kept
countering with studies which showed the investment to be undesirable.
This process continued for nearly two years and was ultimately re-
solved in the subsidiary's favor only after they had managed to build
up a very vocal lobby in the parent company.
6. The management of a Japanese subsidiary in Australia had to pay their
employees a percentage of their salary during a strike as per Australian
law. Headquarters personnel could not understand why this was neces-
sary and tried to pressure subsidiary management to stop these payments.
With respect to the relative influences of headquarters and subsidiaries
in the resolution of issues, our interview data analyses indicated that in
approximately one-half of the cases, headquarters handed down the final de-
cisions, and in less than one-third of the cases subsidiaries' viewpoint pre-
vailed. Among the three sets of subsidiaries, Japanese and German subsidiaries
seem to have more influence in resolving issues.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the preliminary results of our comparative
study of American, German, and Japanese multinational corporations and
their subsidiaries operating in a dozen or so countries. We also compared
the results of this current study with those of the previous study under-
taken in the six developing countries.
More specifically, the topics examined were:
(1) Nature of problems encountered by the three sets of multi-
national companies in industrialized countries.
(2) Nature of problems and conflicts and conflicting issues
between multinationals and host countries of developing
nations.
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(3) Decision-making and relative influences of headquarters
and subsidiaries in strategic and routine decisions.
(4) The nature of critical issues and problems between head-
quarters and subsidiaries.
The analysis of data showed that although the nature and intensity of
problems encountered by multinationals in developing and industrially de-
veloped countries are different somewhat at this point in time—the dif-
ferences between developing and developed countries seem to be narrowing.
Particularly since the 1973 oil crisis, industrially developed countries
faced with the stagnant economic conditions, have begin to focus attention
on the problems of unemployment, economic growth, energy shortages, un-
favorable balance of trade and payments, environmental pollution, and de-
clining growth in productivity. To recall, during the decades of the 1950s
and 1960s and 1970s there were the very same problems, the developing
countries were seeking solutions for and consequently had generated leg-
islations to secure the optimal benefits from the foreign private invest-
ments in their countries.
Although the industrially developed countries have thus far con-
strained themselves in enacting limiting legislations against foreign
private investments and multinational corporations, the public debates
and discussions are moving closer to this end at a faster speed than one
would have anticipated. For example, the recent establishment of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency in Canada and their pronouncements of
expected corporate behavior, as seen from Table 10, comes very close to
what the develping countries have been demanding from foreign investors
during the last two decades.
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TABLE 10
CANADA'S 12 GOOD CORPORATE BEHAVIOR PRINCIPLES (AS THEY RELATE
TO ALLEGED OBJECTIONALBE U.S. SUBSIDIARY POLICIES
Guiding Principle Summary
1. Full realization of the company's
growth and operating potential
in Canada.
2. Make Canadian subsidiary self-
contained, vertically-integrated
entity with total responsibility
for at least one productive
function.
3. Maximum development of export
markets from Canada.
4. Extend processing of Canada's
raw materials through maximum
number of stages.
5. Equitable pricing policies for
international and intracompany
sales.
6. Develop sources of supply in
Canada.
7. Inclusion of R & D and product
development.
8. Retain substantial earnings for
growth.
9. Appointment of Canadian officers
and directors.
10. Equity participation by Canadian
investing public.
11. Publication of financial reports.
12. Support of Canadian cultural and
charitable institutions.
Alleged Objectionable Practice
1. U.S. -based corporate planners
institute expansion and cutback
plans without regard for
Canada's plan and aspirations.
2. The Canadian subsidiary is pri-
marily an assembler of imported
parts or distributor of goods
produced elsewhere so operations
can be easily shut down or
transferred.
3. Filling export orders to third-
country markets from the U.S.
country stocks earns credits
for U.S. balance of payments
rather than Canada's.
4. Have as few materials-processing
stages as possible in Canada to
minimize political leverage.
5. Negotiated or spurious prices by
Canadian-U.S. subsidiaries are
designed to get around Canadian
income taxes.
6. Preference for United States or
third-country sources for pur-
poses of corporate convenience
or political leverage.
7. The concentration of R & D and
product design in the United
States means Canada can never
develop these capabilities.
8. Profits earned in Canada do not
stay to finance Canadian expansion.
9. Use of U.S. officers and directors
to prevent development of local
outlook in planning and execution.
10. Creation of wholly owned subsidi-
aries denies policy determination
and earnings to Canadians.
11. Consolidation of Canadian oper-
ating results Into parent company
statement or failure to publish
any relevant information.
12. Failure locally to support such
causes as the United Appeal where
parent corporations give gener-
ously to comparable U.S. campaigns.
Source: David J. Ashton, "U.S. Investments in Canada: Will the Other Shoe
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More recently, in the United States, approximately one-half of the
50 states have introduced legislations to restrict foreign investments in
agricultural lands. At a lesser end, sub-contractors of U.S. automobile
companies, Swedish, Italian, U.S., French, and even German labor unions
have begun to question the virtue of multinational investments and their
general strategies of global rationalization.
On the other hand, our results concerning- the internal structure and
processes of multinational corporations show that the quest for global
rationalization has caught on and the German MNCs are fact catching up
with the U.S. MNCs in their pursuit of global reach, and the Japanese,
although stumbling here and there, are not far behind. The centralization
of decision-making is thus only a logical consequence of this quest. The
needed autonomy of the subsidiaries to solve the specific socio-economic
problems of the host countries is the victim.
Where do we go from here, is the question, for all of us to ponder,
since we, academicians and businessmen alike, were the ones who not long
ago had proclaimed the virtues of global rationalization.
-31-
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